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The principle of causality, so deeply embed-
ded in humans’ minds that it has been
thought of as immediately evident, is the very
foundation not only of all three monotheistic
world religions but also of the ﬁrst staggering
steps of science [de nihilo nihil (nothing can
be born of nothing); Lucretius 1951]. Hume
(1739) was the first to note that there is no
logical foundation in the assumption that if in
the past every event has had a cause, this will
also be the case in the future and, further-
more, that what we perceive in daily life as
well as in science is only a sequence of events
but not cause and effect. Although Hume
deeply believed in the truth of the principle of
causality, he pointed to the role of the human
mind in constructing reality and the futility of
scientiﬁcally proving its validity. Kant (1791),
as he became acquainted with Hume’s
thoughts, was awakened from his metaphysi-
cal slumber, or so he kept saying, and set out
to solve the problem of how Newton’s
physics, which he thought of as eternally true,
could be possible in the face of Hume’s
demonstration that it cannot be inferred from
experience. The Copernican turn in Kant’s
reasoning was to imply the principle of causal-
ity from the assumption that it is among the
conditions of every experience. Indeed, if A is
a necessary condition of B, then B is a sufﬁ-
cient condition of A. Hence, if for every expe-
rience we make (B) it is a precondition that
everything has a cause (A), then from the fact
that we do have experiences (B), it follows
that everything has a cause (A). However, to
make this a logically coherent theory, Kant
had to sacriﬁce “objective knowledge”—that
is, the Ding an sich (the “thing in itself”)
remains incomprehensible for the human
mind. For more than 100 years, the philoso-
phy of science circled around either the
assumptions or the (untoward) consequences
of Kant’s solution. When in 1905 Einstein
published his special theory of relativity and
his theory of the interaction of electrons and
light (Einstein 1905a, 1905b), the very foun-
dation of Kant’s philosophy was called into
question: the universal truth of Newton’s
mechanics (Newton 1726) and the validity of
the deterministic concept. These considera-
tions not only profoundly changed modern
science but also resulted in an open-ended
controversy within epistemology. And last but
not least, epidemiology and the interpretation
of epidemiologic evidence are deeply con-
nected to these fundamental considerations
about the nature of human knowledge.
Deﬁning Cause and Causality
The most advanced sciences, physics and
chemistry, have altogether abandoned the
concepts of cause and effect. These terms are
no longer used in these sciences. Newton had
already replaced cause and effect with func-
tional relationships; however, to make himself
understood to his contemporaries, in the third
book of his Principia (1726) he spoke about
causes (especially to defend his position of
what can be called a minimal sufﬁcient cause).
Nevertheless, “cause and effect” remained
terms used in physics, somewhat anachronisti-
cally, especially for scholarly purposes until
the end of the 19th century. Mach (1883),
alluding to Hume, stressed the psychological
nature of these concepts and pointed out that
“in nature there is no cause and no effect”
and that these concepts are results of an eco-
nomical processing of perceptions by the
human mind.
The notion that diseases have natural
causes and are not God’s punishments or tri-
als or curses of malicious beings or results of
supernatural forces has not even fully pene-
trated Western culture, let alone become the
prevailing view worldwide. Despite its meta-
physical character, the etiologic axiom that
every disease has an endogenous and/or
exogenous cause was extremely successful and
is still the foundation of scientific medicine.
However, what actually “causes” a disease has
from the very beginning been a matter of
controversy. Indeed, a single clinical phenom-
enon can have quite different “causes,” and
one “cause” can have quite different clinical
consequences (Table 1). These facts are not
consistent with the original concept of causa-
tion, which states that a cause is an object
that is followed by another, and where all
objects similar to the first are followed by
objects similar to the second (Hume 1739).
Not even for infectious diseases does this
(strong) concept of causation hold. (Hume
gave several “definitions” of a cause, among
these also what has been called the counter-
factual approach, discussed below.)
How, then, should cause and causation be
deﬁned? In a review of deﬁnitions of “causa-
tion” in epidemiologic literature, Parascandola
and Weed (2001) delineated five categories.
However, all of these deﬁnitions (summarized
in Table 1) have severe deficits. Not totally
unexpected, the deﬁnitions found in the liter-
ature are insufﬁcient to provide a basis for the
notion of disease causation. As pointed out
above for physical phenomena, it is also
impossible for disease processes to draw an
ontologic demarcation within the indefinite
stream of events between causal and noncausal
associations. 
Consider a human being as a complex
input–output system that is described by a path
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http://dx.doi.org/ [Online 27 March 2006]through a state space (of likely very high dimen-
sionality) that may or may not explicitly
depend on time. The task is to solve the equa-
tions that relate the input stream, the output
stream, and the internal states to each other.
The solution could give the probability that the
human being will be in some internal state of
disease at some point in time given a set of ini-
tial and/or side conditions. If we were in posses-
sion of such a tool, we would not need the
crutch of a concept of causation. Meanwhile, in
a pragmatic sense, it is reasonable to stay with
this concept but hold in mind that it is just an
economical way to organize the otherwise
unfathomable stream of events and to take the
necessary steps to counteract or prevent the dis-
ease process. The process of diagnosis itself is
one of abstraction and generalization because
no two diseased human beings given the same
diagnosis have exactly the same features.
In this pragmatic sense, disease cause can
be defined as follows: Given two or more
populations of subjects that are sufficiently
similar for the problem under study, a disease
cause is a set of mutually exclusive conditions
by which these populations differ that
increase the probability of the disease. In
some cases, the similarity must be high, such
that only homozygous twins can be studied; in
other cases, maybe only sex and age must be
considered, or the state of immunity. To avoid
encumbering the deﬁnition with unnecessary
complexity, we use the term “conditions” and
the active verb “increase.” What is meant is
that a number of extrinsic and/or intrinsic fac-
tors (i.e., conditions) can be discerned that are
present before diagnosis of the disease and that
prevail at a time and for a duration that is com-
patible with what is known about the natural
history of the disease. Hence, this temporal
relation is a precondition for an agent to be
considered a causal factor. The “conditions”
must be mutually exclusive (e.g., groups of
males characterized by one of the following
conditions: smoking or having smoked ciga-
rettes, cigars, pipes only, more than one of
these, or none), because otherwise the increase
in the probability of the disease cannot be
uniquely related to any one of them.
This definition is in line with the main
designs of epidemiologic studies: the cohort,
the case–control, and the randomized con-
trolled trial. It is also in line with the pragmatic
deﬁnition that assessment of causality affords
more than just the observation of an increased
incidence or prevalence in some group or the
other. This is the point from which Sir Austin
Bradford Hill started his considerations that
led to what are now commonly called the
“Bradford Hill criteria” (1965). 
Taking Refuge in Causality
It seems that the first time causality entered
the discussion on epidemiologic results was
during the tobacco controversy in the late
1950s and early 1960s. In particular, the criti-
cism of Fisher (1959) concerning the conclu-
sions drawn from the British Doctors Study
by Doll and Bradford Hill (1954) initiated a
detailed consideration of the concept of
causality that led to the famous presidential
address by Bradford Hill to the Section of
Occupational Medicine of the Royal Society
of Medicine in 1965. In this talk, Bradford
Hill discussed nine issues that should be
addressed when deciding whether an observed
association is a causal relationship. These
issues, now called the “Bradford Hill crite-
ria”—although they were not intended as cri-
teria and not all of them have stood the test of
time—are still the starting point of many a
treatise on the subject today.
The Bradford Hill criteria were established
such that, in the case they are met for a speciﬁc
factor, this would increase our conﬁdence in
this factor being causally related to the disease.
However, they were not intended to dismiss a
factor as potentially causing the disease:
“None of my nine viewpoints can bring indis-
putable evidence for or against the cause-and-
effect hypothesis and none can be required as
a sine qua non” (Bradford Hill 1965).
Some statements in the past few years about
the relationship between environmental or
occupational factors and human health have
used the terms “causality” or “causal” in a nega-
tive sense—that is, claiming that there is no evi-
dence for a causal relationship. First, one has to
discriminate between evidence for no causal
relationship, and no evidence of a causal rela-
tionship (Altman and Bland 1995). The former
expresses an important piece of evidence that
may have substantial consequences on steps
taken to prevent health hazards, whereas the lat-
ter simply expresses lack of knowledge. It is,
however, often misunderstood as an exculpa-
tion of the agent in question and is readily mis-
used by interested parties to claim that exposure
is not associated with adverse health effects.
Some examples of such statements illus-
trate the point:
• A “formal causation analysis based on an
application of the Hill criteria conﬁrms that
there is no causal relationship between diesel
exhaust and multiple myeloma” (Wong
2003).
• “Applying a weight-of-evidence evaluation
to the PCB [polychlorinated biphenyl] epi-
demiologic studies can only lead to the con-
clusion that there is no causal relationship
between PCB exposure and any form of
cancer” (Golden et al. 2003).
• “Results of these studies to date give no con-
sistent or convincing evidence of a causal
relation between RF [radiofrequency] expo-
sure and any adverse health effect” (Ahlbom
et al. 2004). 
There are signiﬁcant differences between these
statements. The last one claims that there is no
“consistent or convincing evidence” (whatever
this may be) of a causal relation. Hence, it
points mainly to the lack of knowledge accu-
mulated so far. The second one goes a step fur-
ther: It claims that risk assessment based on the
weight-of-evidence approach [as applied by the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (U.S.
EPA 1999) or the International Agency for
Research on Cancer (IARC 2004)] leads to the
conclusion of no causal relationship. However,
there is no category of this type in the weight-
of-evidence approaches. Either the category
“not likely carcinogenic to humans” (U.S. EPA
1999) or “evidence suggesting lack of carcino-
genicity” (IARC 2004) may be used. Because of
the by far higher demands on quality and size
of studies set out to dismiss the assumption of
carcinogenicity, there is an inherent imbalance
of classiﬁcation concerning carcinogenicity and
lack of carcinogenicity. The first statement
goes still further: It claims that an analysis
Kundi
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Table 1. Definitions of causation from the epidemiologic literature (modified from Parascandola and
Weed 2001).
Deﬁnition Main criticism
A cause is something that produces or creates an effect. Tautological because “production” and “creation” are 
synonyms of “causation”
A cause is a condition without which the effect cannot occur. Only very few diseases could then have a causea
A cause is a condition with which the effect must occur. Again, only few diseases could then have a causeb
A cause is made up of several components, no  Introduces unnecessary complexity in cases of simple 
single one of which is sufﬁcient of its own, which taken  dose response and in cases of interaction between 
together must lead to the effect. components 
A cause is a condition that increases the probability of  Does not distinguish between an association and a 
occurrence of the effect. “cause”c
A cause is a condition that, if present, makes a difference  Is, in the strict sense, unprovable because there is only 
in (the probability of) the outcome. one world and one cannot observe it twice—once 
with and once without the condition
aMany disease deﬁnitions already include a cause (e.g., AIDS is a clinical syndrome in the presence of HIV infection of
CD4 cells), but this must not be confused with a necessary cause. All clinical symptoms that occur in AIDS patients can
have a variety of other “causes.” bFor example, falling from the 27th ﬂoor onto the pavement is not a necessary cause for
breaking the skull because many other processes can lead to this effect; however, it can be seen as a sufﬁcient cause.
Except for injuries due to extreme physical or chemical conditions and exposure to extremely contagious infectious
agents that lead to death (e.g., rabies) or do not result in immunity (e.g., gonorrhea), there are no sufﬁcient causes in this
strict sense. cFollowing this deﬁnition, male sex would be a cause of lung cancer.based on the Bradford Hill criteria confirms
that there is no causal relationship. Because the
only Bradford Hill criterion that is essential is
“temporal relation,” the only way to conﬁrm—
based on these so-called criteria—that there is
no causal relation is to demonstrate that expo-
sure commenced after disease onset. All other
evidence may reduce the weight in favor of a
causal relationship but cannot confirm that
there is no causal relationship.
Are There Criteria 
for Causation?
During the past decades, Bradford Hill’s criteria
have played almost the same role in occupa-
tional and environmental risk assessment as
Koch’s postulates for microbiology (Koch
1882). As was the case with Koch’s postulates,
which cannot be fulﬁlled for many infectious
agents, so Bradford Hill’s criteria are supportive
(for the assumption of a causal relation) only if
fulfilled, but cannot be used to dismiss the
assumption of a causal relation. It is a complete
misinterpretation of the nine issues considered
by Bradford Hill that they can be a type of
checklist to establish causation. But it may turn
out that they owe their popularity, still persist-
ing after 40 years, exactly to this misconception.
Because the definition of a disease cause
given above affords the existence of mutually
exclusive conditions, in a strict sense, causation
can be indicated only by (experimental) produc-
tion and control of all (relevant) conditions.
This, however, leads to ethical problems if the
factor is potentially debilitating or lethal. And it
is practically impossible if the latency is long, as
it is for chronic diseases. Resorting to animal
experimentation can reduce some of these prob-
lems but introduces new ones, because inference
from results in animals to effects in humans is
far from trivial. Hence, we are often left with a
number of problems that cannot be optimally
solved, and therefore there is no set of criteria
that, if fulﬁlled, would result in attributing a fac-
tor as either causally related or not. This does
not mean that we cannot, to the best of our pre-
sent knowledge, come to a decision concerning
the relationship of an agent and a disease. Or, as
Bradford Hill (1965) said 40 years ago: 
All scientific work is incomplete—whether it be
observational or experimental. All scientiﬁc work
is liable to be upset or modified by advancing
knowledge. That does not confer upon us a free-
dom to ignore the knowledge we already have, or
to postpone the action that it appears to demand
at a given time. 
A Pragmatic Approach
Concerning a particular chemical or physical
factor, general medical knowledge may sufﬁce
to attribute it as harmful and as causing illness
or death (but even in extreme cases such
derivations may not be altogether valid—e.g.,
the statement that it is impossible to climb
Mt. Everest without respiratory aid). But in a
developed society, obviously, hazardous condi-
tions are likely to have been detected already
and are subject to an individual and/or public
risk–beneﬁt evaluation. So we are dealing with
either less obvious hazards or those that occur
only rarely or in a small proportion of the pop-
ulation. The evidence may stem from all kinds
of sources, but often we start only from the
pessimistic assumption that an agent either not
present in the natural environment or present
only at much lower levels may be harmful to
health. Or it may be that during routine sur-
veillance, a high prevalence of a (rare) disease is
observed that coincides with a (rare) environ-
mental condition. How should we come to a
conclusion whether the suspected environmen-
tal condition is causing disease? It might be
worthwhile to stress that there are cases where
we do not need the verdict of causation before
we take action (e.g., a not very important food
additive may be banned on weak evidence of
harmful effects). An important part, and a
much ignored one, of Bradford Hill’s article
deals with such situations, as Phillips and
Goodman (2004) pointed out.
Starting from the definition of a disease
cause stated above, it is obvious that three main
issues need to be addressed (to simplify the dis-
cussion, let us speak of the set of exclusive con-
ditions as of an agent or determinant A):
• Is the probability of the disease conditional
on the presence of A higher than in the
absence of A? (association)
• Is the set of conditions to which the source
populations are exposed sufﬁciently similar
except for A? (environmental equivalence)
• Are the features of the populations that dif-
fer with respect to exposure to A such that,
for the problem under investigation, they
can be considered equivalent? (population
equivalence). 
Association. Although we can to some
degree rely on statistical decision theory con-
cerning an observed difference, some problems
need to be addressed: First, there are cases
where we observe an incidence only in those
exposed to A and contrast it to the overall
incidence in the population (as was the case
with hepatic angiosarcoma in workers exposed
to vinyl chloride monomer). If the disease is
extremely rare in the population, it may not
be feasible to do a conventional epidemiologic
study. However, if a plausible mechanism of
action can be delineated, the observation of an
unexpectedly high incidence of the disease
may sufﬁce for a verdict of causation. Second,
in the case–control approach, we estimate not
the conditional probabilities of the disease but
their ratio. Furthermore, it is questionable
whether statistical decision theory based on
random sampling can be applied without fur-
ther consideration. Typically, all cases of the
target disease occurring within a specified
region (or even only those diagnosed in one or
several hospitals) and during a speciﬁed period
of time are intentionally included, and only
controls are sampled (either from the popula-
tion or from hospital cases presenting with
other than the target disease). To apply statisti-
cal decision theory, we have to assume that the
cases are a random sample from the distribu-
tion of all samples related to all time/space
intervals. Furthermore, the population from
which the cases and controls originate has, in
general, not been stable during the relevant
past. Cases of the target disease that occurred
before study onset are not included, and also
migration in and out of the target area may
play an important role, as might deaths from
other and maybe related causes. Because of
these circumstances and the additional prob-
lem of reliably assessing the presence of A ret-
rospectively, case–control studies are often
denied the potential to form the basis of a
causal interpretation. However, this is exagger-
ating the difﬁculties associated with this study
type. Especially if several case–control studies
from different areas and time periods are avail-
able, a generalization about the ratio of inci-
dences can be made if the different sources of
bias have been thoroughly addressed. Finally,
even if the relative risk (whether estimated
from rate ratios, odds ratios, or hazard ratios) is
high, statistical signiﬁcance may not be reached
if the number of cases exposed to A is low.
Environmental equivalence. Ideally, those
exposed to A should share the same conditions,
besides A, with those not exposed to A. If not,
all relevant conditions that are potentially
related to both A and the outcome (i.e., con-
founding conditions) must be included in the
data set to account for them in the analysis.
Failing to do so—that is, controlling for some
but not others—may increase confounding
instead of removing it (e.g., Maldonado and
Greenland 2001); on the other hand, control-
ling for a variable that is downstream of A may
remove the effect of A (Kaufman and Poole
2000). Because the number of potentially con-
founding factors is indefinite and judgment
about the degree of similarity between environ-
mental conditions depends on limited experi-
ence, there is always the possibility that an
observed association is due to confounding. On
the other hand, the mere suspicion that an
observed association is due to confounding does
not conform to scientiﬁc reasoning because it
cannot be refuted by a ﬁnite sequence of empir-
ical tests. Analysis of uncontrolled confounding
(Greenland 2003; Robins et al. 1999) can give
an idea about the strength of the association
between the confounding variable and both A
and the outcome required to substantially alter
inferences about the existence of an association
between A and the outcome. These approaches
may replace the earlier procedures, as already
applied by Bradford Hill.
Causation in epidemiology
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factual approach to causality (last statement in
Table 1), although of questionable empirical
content, has great heuristic strengths. A coun-
terfactual cause is defined as something that
leads to a difference in the disease propensity
with respect to the same target (population).
Although, of course, it is then impossible to
ever empirically demonstrate such a cause, it
points to the importance of considering all
features of the populations that are substitutes
for the target exposed to A or not exposed to
A, respectively. Ideally, all features of these
substitutes should be equal. However, this
would afford restriction to homozygous twin
studies with twins who shared the same expe-
riences except for exposure to A. However, for
practical purposes, it will suffice to demon-
strate equivalence with respect to the features
that determine susceptibility to A, disposition
to develop the target disease, and the interac-
tion between disposition and susceptibility
(i.e., the joint distribution of these features). 
Unfortunately, as a National Cancer
Institute workshop has stressed (Carbone et al.
2004), there is insufﬁcient evidence to stratify
populations based on susceptibility to develop
cancer. For other chronic diseases, such as ath-
erosclerosis, Alzheimer’s disease, and obstructive
pulmonary disease, there might be even fewer
evidence-based criteria for disposition and sus-
ceptibility. Therefore, a still more modest
approach must be followed that is embedded in
the universal scientiﬁc scheme of bold trial-and-
error correction. As a minimum requirement,
we must address the features that are known to
be related to disease incidence (in most cases,
age will be among these features); features that
indicate early steps of the target disease (e.g.,
polyposis for colon cancer), thereby keeping in
mind that agent A may be effective only during
certain steps of the pathologic process; and fea-
tures that may determine the potential to coun-
teract or aggravate the disease (e.g., social class).
Scientific discussion may reveal that poten-
tially important features have been left out. In
this case, considerations of the potential bias
thereby introduced may reveal that the effect
of A has been underestimated (e.g., if those
exposed to A can be considered less prone to
develop the target disease). If the investigation
resulted in a positive association between A
and the target disease, we might conclude that
no further investigation is needed; if, on the
other hand, no association was revealed, there
is indeed a need for error correction. An ana-
logue procedure follows from a suspected
overestimation of the association.
Environmental equivalence and population
equivalence are usually termed the ceteris
paribus condition and are often jointly dis-
cussed. It is, however, important to discrimi-
nate between environmental and population
characteristics. Only the former can be targets
of change; the latter, although not stationary at
all, must be taken as side conditions that can
be controlled only by active selection. It is also
important to consider self-selection processes
in observational studies where features of the
environment may determine to some degree
features of the population and vice versa.
It goes without saying that all investiga-
tions that are assessed for a causal interpreta-
tion must be scrutinized for potential biases
(especially exposure and outcome misclassiﬁ-
cation and response or observer bias).
However, it is insufﬁcient merely to point to
a potential bias without considering the effect
this bias may have had on the results. For
example, in cohort studies, exposure misclas-
siﬁcation can lead to a bias only in the oppo-
site direction of the reported association.
Under the precondition that all investiga-
tions have been thoroughly assessed concern-
ing association, environmental equivalence,
and population equivalence, and potential
biases, and still the following set of statements
can be derived, then it is reasonable to allo-
cate A among the potentially causal factors of
the target disease:
• The temporal relationship between exposure
to A and disease onset (or diagnosis) conforms
to what is known about the natural history
of the disease.
• There is an association between exposure to
A and the target disease.
• Environmental characteristics in which
exposed and unexposed populations live can
be considered equivalent during the etiolog-
ically relevant period except for A.
• Characteristics of exposed and unexposed
populations are sufficiently similar to con-
sider them equivalent. 
Only the ﬁrst two statements are essential; the
latter two can be substituted by evidence from
experimental or other research demonstrating
a mechanism of action that does not depend
on individual characteristics or environmental
factors. Furthermore, if it is impossible to
demonstrate the equivalence condition, then
other considerations and evidence can be sub-
stituted to support the assumption of a causal
relation (see below).
Temporal relation, association, and envi-
ronmental and population equivalence sufﬁce
for a verdict of potential causation. This asser-
tion can only be refuted by the following:
• Evidence that demonstrates that A is a down-
stream condition of some other factor B (e.g.,
Helicobacter pylori infection instead of gastritis
as a potential causal factor for atherosclerosis)
• Evidence that A is associated with B, the essen-
tial causal agent (e.g., technical tetrachloro-
ethene contaminated with epoxybutane)
• Evidence that essential side conditions have
been overlooked that need to be present to
make A effective or to make non-A preven-
tive (e.g., a speciﬁc receptor phenotype). 
It is not necessary to demonstrate a mechanism
of action. Bradford Hill (1965) and others
pointed to the landmark 1854 study of John
Snow, who demonstrated that the rate of
cholera deaths in London was 14 times higher
in households supplied with water from the
Southwark and Vauxhall Company compared
with households supplied with water from the
Lambeth Company (Snow 1855). Although
Snow suspected a living organism contaminating
Kundi
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Table 2. A pragmatic dialogue approach to causal inferences about an agent or determinant A with respect to a disease D: Evidence from epidemiologic studies.
Counterarguments
In favor of causation Valid Invalid
Temporal relation Exposure to A commenced after onset of D. No mechanism of action of A on any or all stages of D has been 
established.
Association A is a downstream factor of agent/determinant B that has been  Exposure to A has not been precisely assessed. 
indicated as a causal factor of D.
A is associated with B that has been indicated as a causal factor of D. There could be exposure misclassiﬁcation.
There is differential bias (response or observer bias) in the direction of  There is a potential bias (response or observer bias) with unknown 
an association between A and D. effect on the association between A and D.
There has been differential disease misclassiﬁcation in cohort studies. There has been disease misclassiﬁcation in case–control studies but not 
associated with exposure.
Environmental equivalence Confounding conditions with a combined effect exceeding that of agent  There could have been confounding.
A have not been considered.
Population equivalence A is associated with selection into the study population. There is a potential selection bias with unknown effect on the 
association between A and D.
Risk of A applies only to a subgroup of the population.
Exposure is associated with a priori risk to develop the disease.
At this stage no further evidence is necessary for establishing causation unless valid counterarguments have been put forward.drinking water by proximity to sewage, another
30 years elapsed before Robert Koch isolated
Vibrio cholerae, and more than 100 years before
the mechanism of action of the cholera toxin
was established. The original observation of
Snow sufficed to state that something in the
water supplied by one company potentially
caused cholera and to take appropriate action
(closing the pump), and there was no need to
wait until a mechanism of action had been
demonstrated (thereby probably sacriﬁcing the
lives of thousands of people). However, if a
mechanism of action can be established, the
requirements for epidemiologic evidence out-
lined above can be somewhat relaxed.
Because of difﬁculties inherent in observa-
tional studies, it may be impossible to demon-
strate environmental and/or population
equivalence to a sufﬁcient degree, and there-
fore additional evidence and considerations
are necessary to support the notion of a causal
relation between agent A and the target dis-
ease. There is no possible evidence beyond the
three points stated above that will refute epi-
demiologic evidence in favor of a causal rela-
tion besides more and “better” epidemiologic
evidence. Stakeholders tend to “ﬂood” the sci-
entiﬁc literature with inconclusive (powerless
and/or biased) studies in the hope that the
balance of evidence will turn in favor of a less
strong association between agent A and the
target disease. Assessment of evidence must
take this into consideration and make proper
use of such information (which in most cases
will result in disregarding it altogether).
There is an extensive literature about
“criteria” for causal inferences in the health
sciences, most of which goes back to the semi-
nal work of Bradford Hill (1965) and Mervyn
Susser (1973). Although neither author meant
to establish a checklist, but only to formulate
issues that aid in this task, application has
been more or less schematically following
these criteria. However, there is no rule that
can guide the decision. How many of the cri-
teria must be fulﬁlled? Is one counting more
than the other? What to do if none is fulﬁlled?
There is no straightforward answer to these
questions, and every single case merits its own
speciﬁc line of argumentation. 
Tables 2 and 3 propose a dialogue
approach to causal inference. It is assumed that
epidemiologic evidence has been put forward
that is evaluated along the criteria outlined
above. A scientiﬁc dialogue of conjecture and
refutation at ﬁrst tries to dismiss the notion of
a causal relation between agent/determinant A
and disease D along the four issues “temporal
relation,” “association,” “environmental equiv-
alence,” and “population equivalence.” There
are valid and invalid counterarguments. If the
dialogue ends without valid counterarguments,
no further evidence for the verdict of causation
is necessary. More often than not, epidemio-
logic evidence will be insufﬁcient (e.g., due to
short duration of exposure). In this case, other
evidence may support or weaken the assump-
tion of a causal relation between A and D. The
most important of these arguments favoring or
against causation are shown in Table 3.
Arguments against causation are often not
symmetrical to arguments in favor of causa-
tion. For example, a long-term experiment in
animals that results in a higher incidence of the
target disease in exposed animals supports
causal inference, whereas a negative result does
not support the assumption of no causal rela-
tion, because the tested species or strain may
lack a decisive feature (e.g., an enzyme) that is
present in humans and necessary for A to pro-
duce D. There are, however, cases where a pos-
itive result in animal experiments cannot be
taken as evidence for causation because of
processes not present in humans.
Most risk assessment procedures demand
that for chronic diseases such as cancer there
must be epidemiologic evidence before an
extrinsic agent can be ascribed a hazardous
potential for human health. Considering the
long latencies involved in these diseases, there
is a need to define procedures that give
answers about a potential causal relationship
in a more rapid fashion. Traditional epidemi-
ologic evidence can be provided only ex post,
when the health impairment has already
occurred in a significant fraction of the
exposed population. There is an urgent need
to connect the disciplines of molecular biol-
ogy and epidemiology (Carbone et al. 2004).
Such collaboration should result in a) a better
characterization of the study participants with
respect to susceptibility and b) early markers
of responses to the agent in question that can
be assessed long before occurrence of manifest
disease. With regard to such new approaches,
it is of paramount importance to investigate
the mechanism of interaction of the extrinsic
agent with the organism in order to define
potential cofactors and sensitive end points.
For chemical substances, in silico methods and
structure–activity considerations may provide
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Table 3. A pragmatic dialogue approach to causal inferences about an agent or determinant A with respect to a disease D: Evidence increasing or decreasing
conﬁdence in a potential causal relation between A and D.
Type of evidence Increasing conﬁdence Decreasing conﬁdence
From prior knowledge Results conform to predictions from theoretical considerations and/or  Although there are sound arguments for speciﬁcity of outcome, 
prior knowledge about speciﬁcity of outcome, speciﬁcity of type of  speciﬁcity of type of exposure, or speciﬁcity regarding the outcome in 
exposure, or speciﬁcity regarding the outcome in different subgroups  different subgroups of the population, data do not conform to 
of the population. these expectations.
Association between A and D is coherent with biologic knowledge  There is knowledge about mechanism of action that indicates lack of 
and/or a plausible mechanistic model of action can be delineated.  effect of A on D.
From epidemiology Strength of association between A and D exceeds that of potential  There are known confounders not considered in existing investigations 
confounders. strong enough to explain the observed effect.
Association between A and D is consistently observed in different  There is substantial heterogeneity in the effect of A on D in different 
populations, with different types of studies, or in different time intervals. populations, different study types, or different time intervals.
Manipulating A in the population changes pattern and/or frequency of D. Manipulating A in the population does not affect occurrence of D.
In the case a meaningful meter of the “dose” of A can be deﬁned, there  A meaningful “dose” meter can be deﬁned but the relationship between 
exists a dose–response relationship.  “dose” and response is not monotonous. 
From animal studies Long-term animal studies in different species indicate an association  There exist animal models of the disease D, and in none of these 
between A and D (or D´, an analogue of D in these species). models A is effective.
A enhances the effect of a known pathogen B.  No promoting or antagonizing effect of A with a variety of other agents 
could be found in different exposure regimes relevant for human 
exposures.
In animal experiments, intermediate steps of the pathogenic process  In different species that are sensitive to other exposures producing 
can be evoked by exposure to A. effects expected to be similar to those of A, the latter is ineffective. 
From in vitro studies Exposed cells or tissues react or get damaged by exposure to A  In cell lines or tissues sensitive to exposures similar to A, no effect of 
consistent with the pathogenic process of D. exposure to A is found.
Upstream events can be observed by exposure to A that may lead to D  No changes in cellular processes or alterations of signaling pathways 
in the intact organism. can be evoked by exposure to A.
A enhances the effect of a known cellular pathogen B. No promoting or antagonizing effect of A with a variety of other agents 
could be found.Kundi
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ﬁrst answers to a potential path of action (e.g.,
binding to a receptor). For physical factors such
as electromagnetic fields, knowledge is more
limited, and new approaches must be designed.
Despite its metaphysical character, the
principle of causation or, more speciﬁcally, the
notion that every disease has a cause has been
of great heuristic value and likely will govern
our future endeavors for better understanding
of the relationship between the environment
and human health until we have accumulated
more knowledge and may describe the process
by a system of equations. However, the com-
plexity of the problem may be too great ever
to lend itself to complete description.
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